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Abstract
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past
decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by
the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and social ties between them only serve as the indicator
of the existence of interactions. This assumption neglects important information carried by inter-
personal social ties such as genetic similarity, geographic proximity, and social closeness, which may
crucially affect the outcome of interactions. To model these situations, we present a framework
of evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity, where different types of edges
describe diverse social ties. Strategic behaviors together with social ties determine the resulting
payoffs of interactants. Under weak selection, we provide a general formula to predict the success of
one behavior over the other. We apply this formula to various examples which cannot be dealt with
using previous models, including the division of labor and relationship- or edge-dependent games.
We find that labor division facilitates collective cooperation by decomposing a many-player game
into several games of smaller sizes. The evolutionary process based on relationship-dependent
games can be approximated by interactions under a transformed and unified game. Our work
stresses the importance of social ties and provides effective methods to reduce the calculating
complexity in analyzing the evolution of realistic systems.
∗ longwang@pku.edu.cn
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I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in the population of egoists
is an enduring challenge that has inspired a myriad of studies from biology to sociology
[1]. Evolutionary game theory has been widely employed to investigate this cooperation
conundrum at different levels of living systems [2]. Typically, social dilemmas are depicted
by two-player two-strategy games where each player can choose either to cooperate or to
defect [3]. In these games, mutual cooperation brings each player a reward R while mutual
defection a punishment P ; when a cooperator encounters a defector, the cooperator obtains
a sucker’s payoff S and the defector gets the temptation T . Different rankings of payoff
entries R, S, T, P represent different social dilemmas [3]. Despite the simplicity of this rep-
resentation, in the real world, many interactions occur beyond the dyadic scenarios and often
involve more than two individuals. For examples, in a S. cerevisiae population, a coopera-
tive yeast produces an enzyme to hydrolyze sucrose into monosaccharides while the most of
them diffuse away and are exploited by nearby yeasts [4] (see Ref. [5, 6] for more examples
in microbes and Ref. [7, 8] in human societies). Interactions in these examples are better
modeled by multiplayer games [9]. Generally, multiplayer games cannot be represented by a
collection of two-player games [10] whereas the latter can always be regarded as the simplest
case of the former [9], making the study of multiplayer games of great importance for the
evolution of cooperation [11, 12]. One particular example is the threshold public goods game
[13]. It captures the strategic interactions of individuals when the provision of public goods
needs a threshold surpassed. Such a threshold can be a minimum amount of funding for
building national defense, a minimum height of a dam for securing the public safety, etc [8].
In this game, each individual has two options—to contribute an amount of investment to
the goods pool or not to contribute. The benefit is provided only when the total investment
exceeds a threshold [13].
Recent advance in exploring interaction patterns of living agents shows that populations
often exhibit structural characteristics, which expands our research interests in evolutionary
dynamics from traditional well-mixed to structured populations [14–24]. Graphs serve as a
good tool to model such a system, where vertices of graphs represent individuals and edges
specify one’s interaction and dispersal neighborhoods. In the case of weak selection where
individuals’ payoffs obtained from games slightly affect their fitness or reproductive rates,
evolutionary outcomes on graphs, especially the conditions for one strategy to be favored
over the other, can be tackled analytically. For example, Tarnita et al. derive a simple
condition to predict the evolutionary outcome for two-player two-strategy games [25]. This
condition relies on all the payoff entries R, S, T, P and one “structure coefficient”. As shown
in their work, the structure coefficient summarizes all the effects of a population structure
on the condition for the success of strategies and it is independent of payoff entries. Due to
the generality of the above results, calculating structure coefficients provides a convenient
way to quantify the effect of population structures on the evolutionary outcome [10, 23, 26–
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30]. Nonetheless, the closed-form expressions of the structure coefficients are often hard to
calculate under multiplayer games, even in the simplest well-mixed populations [9]. This
becomes even more challenging when the population structure is taken into account. Even
so, there are still a few seminal work about evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs [10, 30–
34]. For example, Pen˜a et al. derive the structure coefficients for evolutionary multiplayer
games on finite ring graphs and infinite regular graphs [32]. Based on competition between
territorial animals, Broom et al. develop a new modelling framework to investigate collective
interactions, which is capable and flexible to compare and analyze various spatial structures
[33]. McAvoy et al. study when a multiplayer game can be broken down into a sequence of
interactions with fewer individuals and show that a simple population structure can greatly
complicate the reduction [10].
Prior studies about games on graphs usually assume that social ties between individuals
only indicate the presence of interactions [10, 20, 30–36]. The other relevant information as-
sociated with social ties, such as the genetic and physical relationships between interactants,
is often ignored. In such cases, individuals’ strategic behaviors are the only determinant of
the outcome of an interaction. Typically, in two-player interactions, if two distinct in-
dividuals take the same strategy, their common opponent obtains the same payoff when
encountering each of them separately [14, 15]. When engaging in group interactions, one’s
payoff relies on the number of opposing cooperators but is independent of which one is the
cooperator [31, 32]. Indeed, this assumption significantly reduces the calculation complexity
and thus makes it possible for many well-known results [37, 38]. However, recent studies
show that overlooking the information of social ties could make theoretical predictions de-
viate greatly from empirical observations [39–42]. For example, people possess strong and
weak social ties, such as intimate interpersonal relationships with relatives and tenuous re-
lationships with acquaintance [42, 43]; failing to account for the tie strengths leads to a
globally accelerated information diffusion and a remarkably distinct diffusion direction from
that in actual networks [40, 41]. In well-mixed populations, when distinct frequencies of
interactions between pairs are considered, altruistic traits can flourish whereas neglecting
such information on social ties leads to the extinction of altruism [23]. Here, the second
example clearly conveys that the information associated with social ties can affect the evo-
lution of a certain behavioral trait (strategy) in a nontrivial way. Besides, we offer two other
representative cases. In the example of the division of labor in colonies of eusocial insects
and human societies, the production of collective benefits needs different individuals to co-
operatively perform different subtasks [44–47]. When many individuals assigned one subtask
cooperate, cooperation from an individual assigned another subtask is more crucial to the
colony productivity than cooperation from individuals assigned the same subtask. The other
situation is that the payoff structure of an interaction may be relationship-dependent [48]. It
means that an individual may concurrently play various types of games with its neighbors,
depending on the social tie they are connected with [49, 50]. For instance, individuals can
play coordinations games (or even harmony games) with its friends and prisoner’s dilemma
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with strangers.
To better understand the role of social ties in the evolution of strategic behaviors, we
present a comprehensive framework of evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge
diversity. Each type of edges describes one kind of relationship between two connected indi-
viduals, such as having the same or different task skills [45–47, 51], owning close or distinct
consanguinity or geographical distance and so on. We investigate both finite and infinite
regular graphs with n types of edges. We provide a simple condition to predict when nat-
ural selection favors one strategic behavior over the other. The condition is validated by
Monte Carlo simulations. Applying it to the case of division of labor where cooperation
from individuals performing different subtasks is required for producing benefits (see the
example of army ants retrieving prey items [45]), we find labor division significantly lowers
the barrier to establish cooperative society. Then we explore the scenario where each indi-
vidual simultaneously participates in many multiplayer games and these games can differ
in payoff entries or metaphors. We find evolutionary dynamics for such diverse interactions
can be approximated by an evolutionary process with a unified payoff structure. This result
provides us insights into simplifying complex and diverse interactions in real-world systems
as simple and unified interactions in theoretical calculations. Our work also covers the evo-
lutionary games on weighted graphs (see the example of bacterium Escherichia coli [52]).
Intriguingly, in our framework, strong edges do not act as a promoter of cooperation.
II. MODELS
Here we briefly introduce the model of evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with
edge diversity. We first consider the stochastic evolutionary dynamics on a graph-structured
population with a finite size N and later investigate the dynamics in infinite populations.
Each individual occupies a node of a random regular graph with degree k. Each node is
linked to k other nodes by n types of edges (1 ≤ n ≤ k), where the number of type i
is gi, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 gi = k. Note that after determined randomly, this graph is fixed during
the process of evolution. Each individual chooses a strategy between A and B. In each
generation, every individual obtains a payoff by interacting with k adjacent individuals in a
single game, analogous to the setting of spatial multiplayer game in prior studies [32, 53]. If
there are si opposing A-players and gi − si opposing B-players among interaction partners
linked by edges of type i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the focal A-player gets a payoff as1s2···sn whereas the
focal B-player gets a payoff bs1s2···sn . Fig 1 illustrates an example of the spatial structure
and Table I presents its payoff structure for n = 2. Our model can recover the traditional
setting by taking n = 1.
After the interaction, individual i’s payoff pii is transformed to its reproductive rate or
fitness by Fi = 1−ω+ωpii. ω represents the intensity of selection, i.e., the extent to which the
payoff from games influences the reproductive success. Here we consider the weak selection
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TABLE I. Payoffs for A- and B-players in multiplayer games with two types of inter-
action partners.
Opposing A-players
(Type 1, Type 2)
(0, 0) (0, 1) (1, 0) · · · (s1, s2) · · · (g1− 1, g2) (g1, g2− 1) (g1, g2)
Payoff to A a00 a01 a10 · · · as1s2 · · · a(g1−1)g2 ag1(g2−1) ag1g2
Payoff to B b00 b01 b10 · · · bs1s2 · · · b(g1−1)g2 bg1(g2−1) bg1g2
Taking social closeness for example, s1 is the number of opposing A−players among g1 partners
with close social relationships and s2 the number of opposing A−players among g2 partners with
distant social relationships.
(ω  1). The population evolves according to the death-birth process [37]. Concretely, a
random individual such as i is selected to die. After that, i’s neighbors compete to replace the
vacancy with probability proportional to their reproductive rate. This update rule can also
be translated into a rule for behavior imitation [16, 23]. For example, a random individual
i resolves to update its strategy, and it adopts neighbor j’s strategy proportionally to j’s
fitness, i.e., with probability Fj/
∑
l∈Ωi Fl, where Ωi is the set of i’s neighbors. In this paper,
we view the updating process as a kind of behavior imitation (other update rules can be
analyzed analogously).
III. RESULTS
A. A general condition to predict the success of one strategic behavior.
In finite populations, the fixation probability is a well-established measure to quantify
the evolutionary success of different traits or strategies [54]. The fixation probability ρA
denotes the probability that a single A-player starting in a random position propagates and
takes over the whole population of B-players. Analogously, ρB is the probability that a single
B-player starting in a random position propagates and takes over the whole population of
A-players. Natural selection favors strategy A over B if
ρA > ρB.
Using weak selection, in large random regular graphs with n edge types (k ≥ 3 and 0 ≤ gi ≤
k), we obtain the condition under which A-players are selected over B-players (see S1 Text,
Section 1), given by
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn
(
as1s2···sn − b(g1−s1)(g2−s2)···(gn−sn)
)
> 0 (1)
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where σs1s2···sn (0 ≤ s1 ≤ g1, 0 ≤ s2 ≤ g2, · · · , 0 ≤ sn ≤ gn) is the structure coefficient that
relies on population structures and update rules but is independent of payoff values as1s2···sn
and bs1s2···sn . There are totally Π
n
i=1(gi + 1) structure coefficients for Eq (58). All structure
coefficients here are positive and we can eliminate an extra structure coefficient through
dividing the sigma rule [see Eq (58)] by any one of them. σs1s2···sn can be approximated by
σs1s2···sn =
(k − 2)(k−
∑n
j=1 sj)
k2(k + 1)(k + 2)
Πnj=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
)
k∑
l=0
(k − l)
{
[2k + (k − 2)l] Ψ
(
k,
n∑
j=1
sj, l
)
+
[
k2 − (k − 2)l]Φ(k, n∑
j=1
sj, l
)}
where
Ψ(k, i, l) =
(
l
k − 1− i
)
1
(k − 2)(k − 1)l +
(
k − 1− l
k − i
)
1
(k − 1)k−1−l ,
Φ(k, i, l) =
(
l
k − i
)
1
(k − 1)l +
(
k − 1− l
k − 1− i
)
1
(k − 2)(k − 1)k−1−l .
as1s2···sn − b(g1−s1)(g2−s2)···(gn−sn) in Eq (58) indicates the “gains from flipping” [32, 34], the
change in payoffs for a focal A-player who interacts with si A-players of type i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
in a group when all individuals change their strategies (from strategy A to strategy B or
B to A) simultaneously. Considering
∑g1
s1=0
∑g2
s2=0
· · ·∑gnsn=0 σs1s2···sn = 1, σs1s2···sn can be
viewed as a probability corresponding to term as1s2···sn − b(g1−s1)(g2−s2)···(gn−sn). Eq (58) thus
indicates that strategy A is favored over B if the expected gain in payoffs from flipping is
positive. When n = 1, our analytical prediction is fully line with a previous study about
evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs [32] (see S1 Text, Section 2). To understand the
structure coefficient for the case with n > 1, we set the sum of the number of opposing
A-players to be S, i.e.,
∑n
j=1 sj = S. We find that σs1s2···sn is the product of the structure
coefficient corresponding to n = 1 (denoted σS) and an additional term Π
n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
/
(
k∑n
j=1 sj
)
.
This term represents the probability of the configuration s1s2 · · · sn to occur under a given S.
Intuitively, with edge diversity, we distinguish A-players in the neighborhood by their types.
For a given number of A-players S, the probability of a specific configuration (si A-players
within gi individuals of type i) indeed follows the multivariate hypergeometric distribution
Πnj=1
(
gj
sj
)
/
(
k
S
)
. Our result shows that the structure coefficient associated with a specific
configuration for diverse edges is simply a product of the probability for this configuration
to occur and the corresponding structure coefficient without distinguishing edges.
Infinite populations usually serve as a baseline model to investigate the evolutionary
dynamics of a system. Therefore we conduct a consistent investigation in infinite popula-
tions. The evolutionary dynamics of multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity can
be described in terms of replicator equation [55] (see S1 Text, Section 4), given by
x˙ =
ω(k − 2)x(1− x)
k2
f(x), (2)
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where f(x) is shown in Methods. This seemingly complicated Eq (75) could be greatly sim-
plified when applied to specific examples, such as traditional multiplayer games or pairwise
games on graphs [55]. In the following, we apply Eq (58) and Eq (75) to several representa-
tive evolutionary scenarios, which cannot be dealt with by prior models.
B. Applications
When strategy A represents cooperation and B defection (A-players cooperators and B-
players defectors), Eq (58) can effectively predict the success of cooperation over defection
in various interaction scenarios of multiplayer games such as volunteer’s dilemmas [56],
multiplayer stag-hunt game [13], and multiplayer snowdrift game [57]. Here we start with
the prevailing collective activity in social insects and human societies—division of labor.
Example 1. Evolutionary multiplayers games with division of labor. Consider a
team of army ants retrieving prey items. They can do this successfully only if different kinds
of ants coordinate to perform corresponding subtasks [45]. In other words, cooperation from
each kind of individuals is required to produce public goods. We consider the simplest case
with two kinds of individuals and the production of benefits requires at least one cooperator
within each kind. We use two types of edges on graphs to model this case: edges of type 1
link the same kind of individuals and edges of type 2 link different kinds of individuals. A
player obtains benefits only if in its neighborhood there are cooperative individuals along
two types of edges. Here we consider the evolution of individuals’ behaviors (cooperation
and defection) while remain individuals subtasks fixed throughout the evolution. Payoff
values are given by
as1s2 =
{
(s1 + s2 + 1)B − C s2 ≥ 1,
−C otherwise, (3)
bs1s2 =
{
(s1 + s2)B s1 ≥ 1, s2 ≥ 1,
0 otherwise,
(4)
where C means the personal cost for each cooperator and B is the benefit to each participant.
Note that a01 is not necessarily identical to a10. The public goods increase linearly with
the number of cooperators, inasmuch as the number exceeds the corresponding threshold,
termed accumulative effects of payoffs. Substituting Eqs (3) and (4) into Eq (58), we have
the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (B/C)∗ above which cooperation is favored over defection,
given by
(B/C)∗ = 1∑g1
s1=0
∑g2
s2=1
(s1 + s2 + 1)σs1s2 −
∑g1−1
s1=0
∑g2−1
s2=0
(k − s1 − s2)σs1s2
.
Then we consider the scenario without division of labor. That is, benefits are produced as
long as the total number of cooperators reaches a threshold. For comparison, we set the
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threshold to be 2. Payoffs are thus as = (s + 1)B − C if s ≥ 1 and as = −C otherwise;
bs = sB if s ≥ 2 and bs = 0 otherwise. (B/C)∗ derived from Eq (58) is
(B/C)∗ = 1∑k
s=1(s+ 1)σs −
∑k−2
s=0(k − s)σs
.
Furthermore, we explore the case that the public goods remain fixed as the number of
cooperators increases, inasmuch as the number exceeds the corresponding threshold (thus
without accumulative effects of payoffs). Payoffs are given by
as1s2 =
{
B − C s2 ≥ 1,
−C otherwise,
bs1s2 =
{
B s1 ≥ 1, s2 ≥ 1,
0 otherwise.
We thus have
(B/C)∗ = 1∑g1
s1=0
∑g2
s2=1
σs1s2 −
∑g1−1
s1=0
∑g2−1
s2=0
σs1s2
.
Analogously, in the counterpart with no labor division, if we set a single threshold 2, payoffs
are as = B − C if s ≥ 1 and as = −C otherwise; bs = B if s ≥ 2 and bs = 0 otherwise. We
have (B/C)∗
(B/C)∗ = 1∑k
s=1 σs −
∑k−2
s=0 σs
.
Panels Fig 2a and 2c show that analytical predictions of fixation probabilities are in good
agreement with results by Monte Carlo simulations for the whole range of benefit-to-cost
ratios and for different parameters of g1 and g2. In Fig 2b, we show that with division of
labor, (B/C)∗ is a monotonous function of g1. Surprisingly, for small g1, i.e., g1 = 1, (B/C)∗
is much lower than that without introducing division of labor. Furthermore, for large g2,
i.e., g1 = 39, (B/C)∗ is far larger than that without introducing division of labor. Therefore,
the introduction of division of labor could significantly lower the barrier to establish a
cooperative society, given a small number of individuals belong to the same type. These
findings are further confirmed when the increasing cooperation does not lead to the increasing
productivity (see Fig 2d).
To make these explicit, we consider a case with a sufficiently large k and without accu-
mulative effects of payoffs. With no division of labor (abbreviated to “ndol”), payoffs of A-
and B-players are respectively given by
pindolA =
[
1− rk(1− pA)k
]B − C,
pindolB =
[
1− (1− rpA)k−1 (1 + kpA − 2pA)
]B,
8
where r = (k − 2)/(k − 1) and pA is the fraction of A-players. With division of labor
(abbreviated to “dol”), payoffs of A- and B-players are
pidolA = [1− rg2(1− pA)g2 ]B − C,
pidolB = [1− (1− rpA)g1 ] [1− (1− rpA)g2 ]B.
For 0 < pA < 1, we have pi
dol
A < pi
ndol
A and pi
dol
B < pi
ndol
B . Thus division of labor transiently
reduces the average payoffs of both A- and B-players. This result is understandable since
with the labor division the condition of producing benefits becomes more stringent. How-
ever, in terms of the long-term development and stable states, the labor division is beneficial
to the evolving system. The labor division actually influence the competition between dif-
ferent behavioral traits and ultimately contributes to a cooperative society, which appears
to be more prosperous. To evaluate how the division of labor influences the competition
between A- and B-players, we compare pidolA /pi
dol
B with pi
ndol
A /pi
ndol
B . If pi
dol
A /pi
dol
B > pi
ndol
A /pi
ndol
B
(pidolA /pi
dol
B < pi
ndol
A /pi
ndol
B ), division of labor enhances (weakens) the advantage of A-players
relative to B-players compared with that under no division of labor. For g1  k, pidolA ap-
proaches to pindolA , indicating the impact of division of labor to A-players is negligible (see
Fig 3a). pidolB is the product of two terms (except B). One term, 1− (1− rpA)g2 , corresponds
to the probability that there are cooperators among players belonging to a different type,
roughly approximating to pindolB /B. The other term is the probability that there exist coop-
erators among players whose types are the same as the focal player. For g1  k, this term
dominates the loss to B-players and weakens the advantages of defectors over cooperators.
The form of pidolB implies that division of labor essentially decomposes a many-player game
into two fewer-player games, i.e., one game in which all participants show the same type
as the focal player and one game in which participants’ types are different from the focal
player. When the focal player belongs to a smaller group, it is harder to free-ride on others,
which makes clear positive effects of division of labor on cooperation thriving. Scenarios
for g2  k can be analyzed analogously (see panels Fig 3c and 3d). This conclusion is still
true with n > 2 types of edges (see S2 Fig). Our results suggest that the more specialized
individuals are, namely, the less individuals are of the same type, the more cooperation will
be achieved. This may explain the flourishing cooperation in the highly specialized human
societies.
Example 2. Diverse multiplayer games. We investigate a scenario where individuals
are engaged in different games concurrently, irrespective of two-player or multiplayer games.
We let individuals linked by the same type of edges form a group to play a multiplayer game.
This means that each focal individual participates in n multiplayer games. These games can
differ in payoff structures, i.e., game metaphors and payoff values. We assume that any two
games are independent and each player accumulates its payoffs gained from each game, i.e.,
as1s2···sn = a
1
s1
+ a2s2 + · · ·+ ansn ,
bs1s2···sn = b
1
s1
+ b2s2 + · · ·+ bnsn .
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where aisi (b
i
si
) presents the payoff assigned to an A-player (a B-player) in the interaction
with individuals of type i when there are si opposing A-players. If g1 = g2 = · · · = gn = g,
Eq (58) can be simplified as (see S1 Text, Section 3)
g∑
s=0
σ˜s
(
n∑
j=1
ajs −
n∑
j=1
bjg−s
)
> 0 (5)
where σ˜s =
∑g2
s2=0
∑g3
s3=0
· · ·∑gnsn=0 σss2···sn . For such a system, we just need g + 1 structure
coefficients to describe the effects of population structures on the evolution of two traits. If
designating
a¯s =
1
n
n∑
j=1
ajs,
b¯s =
1
n
n∑
j=1
bjs,
We have the condition for ρA > ρB, given by
g∑
s=0
σ˜s
(
a¯s − b¯g−s
)
> 0. (6)
Note that a¯s (b¯s) corresponds to the payoff averaged over all games when there are s opposing
cooperators. This suggests that while payoff structures are diverse in different interactions,
the evolutionary outcome can be predicted by assuming that all interactions are governed by
a unified payoff structure, i.e., the ‘average’ over all structures. Alternatively, we can rewrite
Eq (5) as
∑n
j=1
[∑g
s=0 σ˜s
(
ajs − bjg−s
)]
> 0. Note that
∑g
s=0 σ˜s
(
ajs − bjg−s
)
presents the results
when all interactions described by the single payoff structure, i.e., ajs and b
j
s. Therefore, the
evolutionary outcome under diverse multiplayer games can be viewed as the sum of results
obtained when all interactions are governed by a single payoff structure. Both the two
interpretations significantly simplify the calculation complexity when the payoff forms are
relation-dependent. We further confirm the above findings in infinite populations (see S1
Text, Section 3).
We illustrate a few examples in Fig 4, including nonlinear multiplayer game like volunteer
dilemmas [56] and linear public goods games. In a volunteer dilemmas, once an individual
volunteers by bearing a cost Cv, each participant obtains a benefit Bv. In Fig 4a, each
individual participates in two volunteer dilemmas in each generation. When Bv = 1.05 and
Cv = 1 in one interaction and Bv = 10.05 and Cv = 1 in the other, the evolutionary dynamics
can be approximated by the case where all interactions are described by a unified game with
Bv = (1.05 + 10.05)/2 and Cv = (1 + 1)/2. Alternatively, dynamics for the case with half
Bv1 = 1.05 and half Bv2 = 10.05 (blue) can be viewed as the average over that with full
Bv1 = 1.05 (red) and that with full Bv2 = 10.05 (green). Panels Fig 4b and 4c confirm above
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TABLE II. The number of structure coefficients to predict the evolutionary outcome.
general payoff structure payoff structure of diverse multiplayer games
general spatial
structure
Πmi=1
(
gi+ni
ni
) ∑m
i=1(gi + 1)
gi = g for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n
(
g+n
n
)
g + 1
gi 6= gj for any i 6= j Πni=1(gi + 1)
∑n
i=1(gi + 1)
In the general spatial structure, there are m different values among all gis (1 ≤ i ≤ n). We denote
g1, g2, · · · , gm these values and ni the number of value gi, i.e., k =
∑m
i=1 nigi. Note that we can
further eliminate an extra structure coefficient through dividing the sigma rule [see Eq (58)] by a
positive structure coefficient.
findings in linear public goods games and mixed games (half volunteer dilemmas and half
linear public goods games).
We highlight above rules can be further extended to more general cases. When each
collective interaction is endowed with an independent payoff structure (payoff structures in
any two interactions centered on player x are independent; besides, payoff structures in any
interaction centered on player x and those centered on y are uncorrelated), the collective
behavior still can be predicted by an ‘average’ case over all interactions (see panels Fig 4e
and 4f). Furthermore, if the numbers of participants in different collective interactions are
not identical, interactions with the same number of participants can be described by their
‘average’ case. That is, if gl1 = gl2 = · · · = glu 6= gm1 = gm2 = · · · = gmv , interactions with
individuals belonging to type l1, l2, · · · , lu can be resolved as uniform interactions with payoff
matrix a¯ls =
∑lu
j=l1
ajs/u and b¯
l
s =
∑lu
j=l1
bjs/u. Interactions associated with edges of type m1,
m2, · · · , mv can be treated as uniform interactions with payoff matrix a¯ms =
∑mv
j=m1
ajs/v and
b¯ms =
∑mv
j=m1
bjs/v, applicable to sufficiently large finite and infinite populations. Generally,
if there are m different game sizes among n multiplayer games, i.e., g1, g2, · · · , gm, satisfying
gi 6= gj if i 6= j (1 ≤ i, j ≤ m), the number of structure coefficients needed to describe the
effects of population structures decreases to
∑m
i=1(gi + 1). Therefore, in the absence of edge
diversity (thus m = 1 and g1 = k), the number of structure coefficients is k+ 1, in line with
a previous study [32]. If game sizes for all multiplayer games are different (thus m = n), we
need
∑n
i=1(gi + 1) to predict the evolutionary outcome. Table II summarizes the number of
structure coefficients in various cases.
Example 3. Evolutionary multiplayer games on weighted graphs. We proceed
with the application of above findings on weighted graphs. Interactions between individu-
als often differ in capacity, frequency, and strength [58]. Weighted graphs well incorporate
these factors where weights of edges are proportional to interaction frequencies. Partly
since the simple and intuitive understanding of weighted edges, most studies about games
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on weighted graphs so far are based on two-player interactions [23, 28, 59–61]. Although
collective interactions can also occur at different interaction rates like two-player versions,
few studies explore it. The framework proposed in this paper is also applicable to inves-
tigate the multiplayer games on weighted graphs, where different group interactions occur
at different rates. Concretely, individuals linked by the same type of edges are engaged in
a group interaction and these edges are endowed with a uniform weight which represents
the frequency of this group interaction. Thus, a larger value of edge weight means the more
frequent contact [23, 28, 59–61] or more diffusible public goods between interactants [52, 62].
Counter-intuitively, we show that strong social ties do not change the evolutionary fate of
cooperation, irrespective of based on multiplayer or two-player games (see S1 Text, Section
4). As shown in Fig S2a, in finite populations, strong social ties just amplify the fixation
probability (both ρA and ρB) while remains the critical condition B/C for ρA > ρB un-
changed. Analogously, in infinite populations, strong social ties accelerate the evolutionary
rate which do not change the inner equilibria at all (Fig S2b). We can make this clear by
virtue of conclusions in Example 2. In volunteer’s dilemmas, the payoff matrix for interac-
tions with individuals of type j is ajs = Bjv − Cjv for any s, bjs = Bjv for s > 0, and bjs = 0
for s = 0. We take Bjv = ζjBv and Cjv = ζjCv, where ζj denotes the weight of edges linking
individuals of type j. From Example 2, the evolutionary dynamics can be approximated by
unified interactions with payoff matrix a¯s = B¯v − C¯v for any s, b¯s = B¯v for s > 0, and b¯s = 0
for s = 0, where B¯v =
∑n
j=1 Bjv/n = Bv
∑n
j=1 ζ
j/n and C¯v = Cv
∑n
j=1 ζ
j/n. Combining
Eq (6), we have the critical condition (Bv
Cv
)∗
=
1
σ˜g
above which ρA > ρB. Note that (Bv/Cv)∗ is independent of edge weights
∑n
j=1 ζ
j.
Example 4. Evolutionary two-player games on graphs with edge diversity. As
a consistency check, we investigate two-player games. Distinguished from previous studies,
here each type of edges are endowed with an independent payoff matrix. The payoff matrix
for interactions occurring in edges of type i is
( A B
A αi βi
B γi θi
)
,
where each value corresponds to the payoff assigned to the individual adopting a strategy
in the row against its partner taking a strategy in the column. Transforming the pay-
off to multiplayer interactions through as1s2···sn =
∑n
i=1 [siαi + (gi − si)βi] and bs1s2···sn =∑n
i=1 [siγi + (gi − si)θi], we have the sigma rule from Eq (58)
n∑
i=1
s¯iαi +
n∑
i=1
(gi − s¯i) βi −
n∑
i=1
(gi − s¯i) γi −
n∑
i=1
s¯iθi > 0,
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where
s¯i =
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···snsi.
Applying (see S1 Text, Section 3)
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···snsi =
gi(k + 1)
2k
,
we have the sigma rule for evolutionary two-player games on graphs with edge diversity
n∑
i=1
[gi(k + 1)αi + gi(k − 1)βi] >
n∑
i=1
[gi(k − 1)γi + gi(k + 1)θi] .
Since
∑n
i=1 gi = k, dividing both sides of the above condition by k, we obtain the simplified
condition
k + 1
k − 1 α¯ + β¯ > γ¯ +
k + 1
k − 1 θ¯
where α¯ = (1/k)
∑n
i=1 giαi, β¯ = (1/k)
∑n
i=1 giβi, γ¯ = (1/k)
∑n
i=1 giγi, and θ¯ = (1/k)
∑n
i=1 giθi.
The above condition suggests that for pairwise games contingent on the edges, it suffices to
study a unified game with its payoff entries averaged over all the games. Note that for the
unified game, the associated structure coefficient is (k + 1)/(k − 1), which coincides with
that with n = 1 [25, 37]. Moreover, if all the games are in the form of donations games,
i.e., αi = Bi − Ci, βi = −Ci, γi = Bi, and θi = 0, the condition for natural selection favoring
cooperation over defection is
B¯
C¯ > k. (7)
where B¯ = (1/k)∑ni=1 giBi and C¯ = (1/k)∑ni=1 giCi This equation thus extends a well-known
B/C > k rule (B and C are respectively the benefit and cost of the donative behavior) [37]
to a general B¯/C¯ > k rule where C¯ means the average cost for cooperative behavior on all
possible types of edges and B¯ is the average benefit [63] (see Fig 4f).
IV. DISCUSSION
Due to variations in both environment or gene, individuals own distinct social status or
play different roles in colonies [64, 65]. Typically, individuals with geographic proximity
and genetic similarity tend to establish stronger social ties than those separated by remote
geographic space or distinguished by large genetic difference. Encountering different types
of individuals, one may be affected differently. Here we model the heterogeneous influence
by different types of edges and develop a framework of evolutionary multiplayer games on
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graphs with edge diversity. Since the two-player game is the simplest multiplayer game, our
findings are applicable to pairwise interactions. We make a thorough investigation in both
finite and infinite populations. We provide the analytical formulas of structure coefficients
for random regular graphs with n types of edges, which effectively predicts when natural
selection favors one strategic behavior over the other.
As the first application of our framework, we consider how the division of labor affects
the evolution of cooperation. As well known, the division of labor prevails in colonies of
social insects, hunting groups of lions, and human societies [44–47, 51], where individuals
are born or trained to perform specialized subtasks. Such specialization not only makes
them more productive on their own subtasks but also results in synergistic effects on the
overall productivity when they cooperate with each other. We here model the strategic
interactions under the division of labor as a multi-threshold public goods game. The public
goods are provided only when individuals of distinct types cooperate. We find that the
division of labor could promote the evolution of cooperation. The reason lies in that task
specialization decomposes a many-player interaction into several fewer-player interactions.
Such a decomposition helps reduce the free-riding behaviors.
Our framework are also able to address the more realistic situation where individuals
concurrently face diverse social dilemmas. This is in stark contrast with the ideal assumption
in most previous studies where all interactions are described by a unified game metaphor [19–
22, 30–32]. In the real word, an individual may be caught in a volunteer’s dilemma with its
colleagues and meanwhile engage in public goods games with its neighbors. The inevitable
extinction of cooperation in the public goods game seems desperate. Fortunately, the public
goods game is merely one of the many types of social dilemmas individuals encounter. Our
work reveals that leveraging the distinct nature of diverse social dilemmas can entail an
evolutionary outcome where cooperators are rescued and are able to coexist with defectors.
In addition, a seminal work by McAvoy et. al. tells that under asymmetric two-player games
the evolutionary processes behave macroscopically like that governed by symmetric games
[63]. Here we confirm that irrespective of two-player or multiplayer games, the evolutionary
dynamics with diverse interactions can be approximated by that governed by a single game.
For more complicated cases where sizes of group interactions are different, we also provide an
efficient method to simplify it. Our work greatly reduces the complexity when investigating
the evolutionary dynamics in real-world systems.
Besides, multiplayer games on weighted graphs can be considered. We find that the pres-
ence of strong social ties does not always provide an evolutionary advantage to cooperators,
which seems to coincide with recent findings under aspiration dynamics [61]. This contrasts
with the conclusion in Ref. [23] where they show that strong ties boost cooperation most.
The main difference between our work and theirs is that we do not couple the strength of
interactions and the probability of replacement along an edge. In their work, a strong social
tie indicates not only a higher frequency of interactions but also a more probable path for
strategy dispersal. Simultaneously enhancing the strength of interactions and the likelihood
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of dispersal lead to a strong strategy reciprocity between individuals and thus facilitate the
clustering of cooperators. However, if strong ties merely indicate frequent interactions as in
our work, we show that they fail to promote cooperation, irrespective of group or pairwise
interactions. Note that in our model, individuals derive payoffs only from interactions with
their nearest neighbors [32, 53]. When individuals can interact with both the nearest and
second-nearest neighbors, the impact of social ties on the evolution of cooperation are more
complicated [62]. A further investigation along this direction may generate new insights.
Our work also extends the research scope about the interplay between the evolution of
a population and the diversity. The two basic elements of a population are individuals and
social ties. Most prior studies about diversity focus on individuals’ attributes, such as the
number of social ties they have, the ability to influence their opponents, etc [66, 67]. Such
diversity highlights that two individuals are different when possessing different attributes.
Here we stress the diversity of social ties. Social ties not just establish the connections
between separated individuals. They carry a massive amount of information about two
connected individuals, such as the intimacy of the interpersonal relationships, the frequency
of physical contact, and even the history about previous interactions. All these are unlikely
to be captured by individuals’ attributes. The example of division of labor also proved
that the diversity of social ties (or edge diversity) could catalyze cooperation. Our recent
work about interactive diversity is pertinent to this topic [24, 68]. Interactive diversity
describes that each individual adopts independent strategies in different interactions. Thus
even facing an identical strategy by two different opponents, the focal individual could be
influenced differently due to its own behavior. Nevertheless, the influence difference fully
depends on strategies between interactants and is unrelated to other information like genetic
similarity or geographic proximity. Thus, interactive diversity does not essentially capture
diverse social ties explored in this paper [36]. We wish our work could attract more work
into the evolutionary dynamics along edges.
In this paper we constrain that each social tie has symmetric effects on connected indi-
viduals. For example, if Alice is close to Bob in consanguinity or geographic sites, Bob is
close to Alice. Thus the benefit that cooperative Alice brings to Bob is identical to that of
cooperative Bob to Alice. A promising and challenging extension is the interactions with
asymmetric social ties, such as the relationship between leaders and followers. In such case,
each individual should be endowed with an independent payoff function [10, 69]. Despite
much complicity in analytical calculations, we expect a further research into this realistic
situation, which is bound to provide fruitful insights. We point out that our theoretical re-
sults are based on assumption of weak selection, as used by most previous theoretical studies
[19–22, 31, 32, 34]. Although the assumption of weak selection is reasonable in many cases
and also make this conundrum accessible to analytical calculation [70], other situations rou-
tinely encountered in social or natural science are better captured by strong selection. Thus,
a further investigation with strong selection is necessary to enrich our understanding to the
collective behavior in complex systems [35, 71]. Finally, in this paper, we assume that the
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types of edges remain unchanged throughout the evolution. This is natural in many cases,
like when types of edges indicate the geographic proximity. Nevertheless, when edges’ types
represent the genetic difference between linked individuals and the population evolve based
on individuals’ reproduction, edges’ types evolve as well [63]. A study into the coevolution
of individuals’ traits and edge types is expected.
METHODS
Theoretical analysis
We derive the analytical formulas based on the combination of pair approximation and
diffusion theory. The method of pair approximation is formulated for infinite Cayley trees or
Bethe lattices, which are regular graphs without any loops. For finite but sufficiently large
random regular graphs (N  k), loops tend to be quite large, which has negligible impacts
to validity of the pair approximation. Thus the obtained formulas approximate the simulated
results. The detailed theoretical derivations is provided in Supporting Information. f(x) in
Eq (75) is
f(x) =
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
xsj(1− x)gj−sj
]
(Λa − Λb) ,
Λa =
g1−s1∑
r1=0
g2−s2∑
r2=0
· · ·
gn−sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)gj−sj−rj
]
n∑
j=1
[
(sj + rj) a(s1+r1)(s2+r2)···(sn+rn)
+
(
zsj +
rj
z
)
a(s1+r1−δ1j)(s2+r2−δ2j)···(sn+rn−δnj)
]
,
Λb =
s1∑
r1=0
s2∑
r2=0
· · ·
sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)sj−rj
]
n∑
j=1
[
(gj − sj + rj) b(s1−r1)(s2−r2)···(sn−rn)
+
(
z(gj − sj) + rj
z
)
b(s1−r1+δ1j)(s2−r2+δ2j)···(sn−rn+δnj)
]
.
z = 1/(k − 1). δij equals to 1 if j = i and 0 otherwise.
Computer simulations
Network generation: We present the procedure to produce a random regular graph with
n types of edges, where the number of edges of type i linked to each node is gi (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
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We take g1 ≥ 2. Given values of gi, we first construct a random regular graph of degree g1
and make sure that it is connected. All edges in this graph are assigned to be type 1. Then
we augment this graph by increasing the degree of all nodes by g2. All edges added in this
step are assigned to be type 2. Repeating this procedure for n− 1 times where the augment
degree is gi+1 in ith augment, we assign the edges added in ith augment to be type i + 1.
Finally, we generate a random regular graph with degree
∑n
i=1 gi.
Fixation probability ρA: In a generated random regular graph with N = 200 and n = 2 (g1
and g2 are given in corresponding figures), a random node is selected to be A-player and
the rest are B-players. The system evolves as described in Models with selection intensity
ω = 0.01. The evolution does not end until all nodes turn to A-players or B-players.
Repeating graph generation and subsequent system evolution for 107 runs, ρA is the fraction
of times where A-players reach fixations. ρB is calculated analogously.
Replicator equation: In a generated random regular graph with N = 1000 and g1 = 3,
g2 = 3, a random value of f is sampled uniformly from the interval [0, 1]. Then each node is
initiated to be a cooperator with probability f and a defector otherwise. The system evolves
as described in Model with selection intensity ω = 0.01. We term a time step during which
the population updates N times. Let pA(t) denote the frequency of A-players at time step t
and pA(0) the initial frequency of A-players. Let ∆pA(t) denote the change in frequency of
A-players within a time step starting at time step t, i.e., ∆pA(t) = pA(t+ 1)−pA(t). ∆pA(t)
is associated with pA(t) and is recorded. The evolution does not end until all nodes turn to
A-players or B-players. The graph generation, sample of f , and subsequent system evolution,
are repeated for 50000 times if there is an inner equilibria, which can be predicted by Eq (75),
and for 1000000 times if there is no any inner equilibria. Finally, ∆pA corresponding to pA
is the average of recorded ∆pA(t), as plotted in Figs 4 and S2.
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FIG. 1. Illustration of evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with two types of
edges. (a) Each node is linked to 4 other nodes (k = 4) by two types of edges, one marked by solid
line (g1 = 3) and the other marked by dashed line (g2 = 1). Each node is occupied by an individual,
either A- (red circle) or B-player (blue circle). One’s payoff is determined by the strategies of its
own and all individuals occupying neighboring nodes. For example, in the highlighted area, all
individuals altogether determine the payoff of the centered individual. (b) Interacting with an
A- and two B-players linked by edges of type 1, and an A-player linked by an edge of type 2,
the centered B-player gains a payoff b11. (c) The centered B-player obtains a payoff b20 when
interacting with two A- and a B-player linked by edges of type 1, and a B-player linked by an edge
of type 2. Note that b11 differs from b20 although the total number of neighboring A-players is the
same.
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FIG. 2. Difference in fixation probability ρA-ρB and critical benefit-to-cost ratio (B/C)∗
for ρA > ρB as a function of g1. (ab) Division of labor with accumulative effects of payoffs
(the increasing number of cooperators leads to the increasing productivity). (cd) Division of labor
without accumulative effects of payoffs (the productivity remains unchanged as the increasing
number of cooperators). In (a) and (c), we consider n = 2 and different parameters of g1 and
g2. Dots presents simulation data (see Methods for simulation details) and lines are analytical
predictions. ρA − ρB is analytically predicted by the product of the left side of Eq (58) and the
selection intensity ω. In (b) and (d), dash lines correspond to (B/C)∗ for the case with no division
of labor and solid lines (B/C)∗ for the case with division of labor, where g2 = 40− g1.
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FIG. 3. Average payoffs as a function of pA with no (dash lines) and with (solid
lines) division of labor. Here the increasing number of cooperators does not lead to increasing
productivity, inasmuch as the number exceeds the threshold. (a) For g1 = 5 and g2 = 35, division
of labor does not affect the average payoff of A-players (piA) much while reduce the average payoff of
B-players (piB) significantly. This increases piA/piB for the whole range of pA (b), and thus weakens
the advantages of defectors over cooperators. (c) For g1 = 35 and g2 = 5, division of labor reduces
both piA and piB remarkably. Nevertheless, the impact to piA is more noticeable than to piB (d) and
thus reinforces the advantages of defectors over cooperators. We take B = 2 and C = 1.
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FIG. 4. Average change (∆pA) in the frequency of A-players (pA), in volunteer’s
dilemma (VD), public goods games (PGG), diverse multiplayer games (VD/PGG),
and diverse two-player games (PD/SG). The population structure is a random regular graph
with N = 1000, n = 2, and g1 = g2 = 3. In (a-c), the cost to cooperate is fixed to 1 and benefits
are shown in the legend of each panel. In (d), under PD, a cooperator bears a cost 1 to provide its
opponent with a benefit BPD. Under each SG, the total cost for cooperators is 1 and the benefit
for each player is BSG. Three cases are investigated in each panel of (a-d). For example, in (a),
benefits in all multiplayer interactions are Bv1 = 1.05 (red dots), Bv2 = 10.05 (green dots), or
designated at equal proportions (blue dots). In (ef), both benefits and costs in each interaction are
sampled according to a Gaussian distribution, with mean 5.05, variance 1.5 for benefits and mean
1.0, variance 0.25 for costs (e), mean 5.1 and variance 1.5 for benefits and mean 1.0 and variance
0.25 for costs (f). Dots represent the simulation data and lines are analytical predictions based on
unified interactions with average payoffs (see Methods for simulation details).
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FIG. 5. Evolutionary multiplayer games on weighted graphs. Each individual participates
in two volunteer’s dilemmas and both group sizes are 4. Benefits and costs are Bv1 and Cv1 for one
dilemma, Bv2 and Cv2 for the other. (a) Difference in fixation probability ρA − ρB as a function
of benefit-to-cost ratio (B/C). (b) Average change (∆pA) in the frequency of A−players (pA).
Arrows in (a) mark the analytical benefit-to-cost ratio (B/C)∗ and solid lines in (b) represent
analytical change in pA. Dots represent the simulation data (see Methods for simulation details).
Heterogeneous weights of edges do not change the critical benefit-to-cost ratio (B/C)∗ in the finite
population (a) or the inner equilibria (black point) in the infinite population (b).
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FIG. S1. Analytical fixation probability is in good agreement with simulation results.
Solid lines present the analytical fixation probability of cooperators (ρA) and dash lines show
the analytical fixation probability of defectors (ρB). Dots show results by computer simulations.
Parameters in (a) follow Fig 2a and parameters in (b) follow Fig 2c.
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FIG. S2. Division of labor could reduce the free-riding behaviors for n > 2. On graphs
with n types of edges, the production of benefits requires cooperation from players linked by each
type of edges. Note that the focal player and its neighbors linked by edges of type 1 are of the
same type. Here the increasing number of cooperators does not lead to the increasing productivity,
inasmuch as the number exceeds the threshold. (a) Difference between r∗ with division of labor
(“dol”) and with no division of labor (“ndol”). n = 3 and g1 + g2 + g3 = 40. The upper right zone
is invalid given a positive g3. The block dots present the configurations of g1 and g2 for which r
∗s
with division of labor and with no division of labor are nearly equal. (b) r∗ as a function of n. We
fix
∑
1≤i≤n gi = 40, gi = 5 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and vary g1. Both (a) and (b) show that a small
value of g1 facilitates cooperation.
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION (SI)
I. SECTION 1. FIXATION PROBABILITY, STRUCTURE COEFFICIENT, AND
REPLICATOR EQUATION FOR EVOLUTIONARY MULTIPLAYER GAMES ON
GRAPHS WITH n TYPES OF EDGES
A. Pair approximation
Let pA and pB be the frequencies of A-players and B-players in a population. Let pAA,
pAB, pBA and pBB be the frequencies of AA, AB, BA and BB pairs. Let qX|Y be the
conditional probability of finding an X-player given that the adjacent node is occupied by
a Y -player, where X and Y are either A or B. Let Gi denote the subgraph consisting of
all nodes and edges of type i. We distinguish aforementioned variables associated with Gi
labelling (Gi), such as p
(G1)
AA the frequencies of AA pairs in G1 and p
(G2)
AA in G2. p
(Gi)
A is
identical to p
(Gj)
A for any pairs i, j, and thus we simplify them as pA. In the random regular
graphs with n types of edges, we have identities
pA + pB = 1 (8)
p
(Gi)
AB = p
(Gi)
BA (9)
q
(Gi)
X|Y =
p
(Gi)
XY
pY
(10)
q
(Gi)
A|Y + q
(Gi)
B|Y = 1 (11)
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Eqs (8-11) imply that the whole system can be described by n + 1
variables, i.e. pA and q
(Gi)
A|A where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. These notations are given by
pB = 1− pA
p
(Gi)
AA = pAq
(Gi)
A|A
p
(Gi)
AB = p
(Gi)
BA = pA(1− q(Gi)A|A )
p
(Gi)
BB = 1− 2pA + pAq(Gi)A|A
q
(Gi)
B|A = 1− q(Gi)A|A
q
(Gi)
B|B =
1− 2pA + pAq(Gi)A|A
1− pA
q
(Gi)
A|B =
pA(1− q(Gi)A|A )
1− pA
Let gi denote the node degree in Gi. The node degree for the entire network is k =
∑n
i=1 gi.
Let as1···sn be the payoff of an A−player that has si neighboring A−players and gi − si
neighboring B−players in Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let bs1···sn be the payoff of a B−player that
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has si neighboring A−players and gi − si neighboring B−players in Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Each
individual is assigned a payoff by a single interaction with all neighbors. Then the payoff
is transformed to the fitness for the evolution of system. Here the population evolves based
on the Moran death-birth process [37]. In each generation, a random individual is selected
to die. All neighbors compete to occupy the empty site proportional to their fitness. Other
process can be investigated analogously. In the following, we calculate the expected change
of pA and p
(Gi)
AA in each step.
B. Updating a B-player
A B-player is selected to die with probability pB. Its k neighbors compete to take over the
vacant node. Let k
(Gi)
A and k
(Gi)
B denote the number of A- and B-players among gi neighbors
in Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ n). We have k(Gi)A + k(Gi)B = gi. The probability for such a neighborhood
configuration is
Bg1···gi···gn
k
(G1)
A ···k
(Gi)
A ···k
(Gn)
A
=
n∏
i=1
(
gi
k
(Gi)
A
)
(q
(Gi)
A|B )
k
(Gi)
A (q
(Gi)
B|B )
k
(Gi)
B . (12)
Then the average fitness of each A-player and each B-player connected to this dead B-player
by an edge in Gi are respectively given by
F
(Gi)
A|B = 1− ω + ωpi(Gi)A|B ,
F
(Gi)
B|B = 1− ω + ωpi(Gi)B|B ,
where
pi
(Gi)
A|B =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)(
q
(Gj)
A|A
)sj (
q
(Gj)
B|A
)gj−δi,j−sj]
as1···si···sn , (13)
pi
(Gi)
B|B =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)(
q
(Gj)
A|B
)sj (
q
(Gj)
B|B
)gj−δi,j−sj]
bs1···si···sn (14)
represent the expected payoffs from interactions with
∑n
i=1 gi neighbors. δi,j = 1 if j = i
and δi,j = 0 if j 6= i. The parameter ω denotes the intensity of selection and w  1 means
that the payoff from the game just contributes a little to one’s fitness. Here we consider the
weak selection.
The probability that an A-player takes over the empty site is given by∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
A F
(Gi)
A|B∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
A F
(Gi)
A|B +
∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
B F
(Gi)
B|B
=
∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
A
k
+
ω
k2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
k
(Gi)
A k
(Gj)
B
(
pi
(Gi)
A|B − pi(Gj)B|B
)
+O(ω2). (15)
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Therefore, combining Eqs (12,15), pA increases by
1
N
with probability
Prob
(
∆pA =
1
N
)
=pA
g1∑
k
(G1)
A =0
· · ·
gi∑
k
(Gi)
A =0
· · ·
gn∑
k
(Gn)
A =0
Bg1···gi···gn
k
(G1)
A ···k
(Gi)
A ···k
(Gn)
A∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
A F
(Gi)
A|B∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
A F
(Gi)
A|B +
∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
B F
(Gi)
B|B
=
pB
k
n∑
i=1
giq
(Gi)
A|B +
ωpB
k2
ΓB +O(ω
2)
where
ΓB =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gigjq
(Gi)
A|B q
(Gj)
B|B
(
pi
(Gi)
A|B − pi(Gj)B|B
)
−
n∑
i=1
giq
(Gi)
A|B q
(Gi)
B|B
(
pi
(Gi)
A|B − pi(Gi)B|B
)
(16)
Regarding pairs, if an A-player in Gi occupies the vacant site then the number of AA
pairs in Gi increases by k
(Gi)
A . Given that the total number of pairs in Gi is giN/2, the
probability that p
(Gi)
AA increases by 2k
(Gi)
A /(giN) is given by
Prob
(
∆p
(Gi)
AA =
2k
(Gi)
A
giN
)
=pB
g1∑
k
(G1)
A =0
· · ·
gi−1∑
k
(Gi−1)
A =0
gi+1∑
k
(Gi+1)
A =0
· · ·
gn∑
k
(Gn)
A =0
Bg1···gi···gn
k
(G1)
A ···k
(Gi)
A ···k
(Gn)
A∑n
j=1 k
(Gj)
A F
(Gj)
A|B∑n
j=1 k
(Gj)
A F
(Gj)
A|B +
∑n
j=1 k
(Gj)
B F
(Gj)
B|B
C. Updating an A-player
An A-player is selected to die with probability pA. All k individuals, i.e., k
(Gi)
A A-players
and k
(Gi)
B B-players in Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), compete to occupy the empty site. The probability
for such a neighborhood configuration is given by
Ag1···gi···gn
k
(G1)
A ···k
(Gi)
A ···k
(Gn)
A
=
n∏
i=1
(
gi
k
(Gi)
A
)
(q
(Gi)
A|A )
k
(Gi)
A (q
(Gi)
B|A )
k
(Gi)
B . (17)
Then the average fitness of each A-player and each B-player connected to this dead A-player
by an edge in Gi are respectively given by
F
(Gi)
A|A = 1− ω + ωpi(Gi)A|A ,
F
(Gi)
B|A = 1− ω + ωpi(Gi)B|A ,
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where
pi
(Gi)
A|A =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)(
q
(Gj)
A|A
)sj (
q
(Gj)
B|A
)gj−δi,j−sj]
as1···(si+1)···sn , (18)
pi
(Gi)
B|A =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)(
q
(Gj)
A|B
)sj (
q
(Gj)
B|B
)gj−δi,j−sj]
bs1···(si+1)···sn (19)
represent the expected payoffs from interactions with
∑n
i=1 gi neighbors.
The probability that a B-player takes over the empty site with probability
∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
B F
(Gi)
B|A∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
A F
(Gi)
A|A +
∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
B F
(Gi)
B|A
=
∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
B
k
+
ω
k2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
k
(Gi)
A k
(Gj)
B
(
pi
(Gj)
B|A − pi(Gi)A|A
)
+O(ω2). (20)
Therefore, combining Eqs (17) and (20), pA decreases by
1
N
with probability
Prob
(
∆pA = − 1
N
)
=pA
g1∑
k
(G1)
A =0
· · ·
gi∑
k
(Gi)
A =0
· · ·
gn∑
k
(Gn)
A =0
Ag1···gi···gn
k
(G1)
A ···k
(Gi)
A ···k
(Gn)
A∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
B F
(Gi)
B|A∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
A F
(Gi)
A|A +
∑n
i=1 k
(Gi)
B F
(Gi)
B|A
=
pA
k
n∑
i=1
giq
(Gi)
B|A +
ωpA
k2
ΓA +O(ω
2)
where
ΓA =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gigjq
(Gi)
A|A q
(Gj)
B|A
(
pi
(Gj)
B|A − pi(Gi)A|A
)
−
n∑
i=1
giq
(Gi)
A|A q
(Gi)
B|A
(
pi
(Gi)
B|A − pi(Gi)A|A
)
(21)
Regarding pairs, if a B-player in Gi occupies the vacant site then the number of AA pairs
in Gi decreases by k
(Gi)
A and therefore p
(Gi)
AA decreases by 2k
(Gi)
A /(giN) with probability
Prob
(
∆p
(Gi)
AA = −
2k
(Gi)
A
giN
)
=pA
g1∑
k
(G1)
A =0
· · ·
gi−1∑
k
(Gi−1)
A =0
gi+1∑
k
(Gi+1)
A =0
· · ·
gn∑
k
(Gn)
A =0
Ag1···gi···gn
k
(G1)
A ···k
(Gi)
A ···k
(Gn)
A∑n
j=1 k
(Gj)
B F
(Gj)
B|A∑n
j=1 k
(Gj)
A F
(Gj)
A|A +
∑n
j=1 k
(Gj)
B F
(Gj)
B|A
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D. Different time scales
Supposing that one replacement event takes place in one unit of time, we can get the
time derivatives of pA and p
(Gi)
AA , given by
p˙A =
1
N
· Prob
(
∆pA =
1
N
)
+
(
− 1
N
)
· Prob
(
∆pA = − 1
N
)
=
ω
Nk2
(pBΓB − pAΓA) +O(ω2), (22)
p˙
(Gi)
AA =
gi∑
k
(Gi)
A =0
2k
(Gi)
A
giN
· Prob
(
∆p
(Gi)
AA =
2k
(Gi)
A
giN
)
+
gi∑
k
(Gi)
A =0
(
−2k
(Gi)
A
giN
)
· Prob
(
∆p
(Gi)
AA = −
2k
(Gi)
A
giN
)
=
2pA
Nk(1− pA)
[
n∑
j=1
gj
(
1− q(Gj)A|A
)(
pA − q(Gi)A|A
)
+
(
1− q(Gi)A|A
)(
1 + q
(Gi)
A|A − 2pA
)]
+O(ω),
(23)
From Eqs (22) and (23), we have
q˙
(Gi)
A|A =
d
dt
(
p
(Gi)
AA
pA
)
=
2
Nk(1− pA)
[
n∑
j=1
gj
(
1− q(Gj)A|A
)(
pA − q(Gi)A|A
)
+
(
1− q(Gi)A|A
)(
1 + q
(Gi)
A|A − 2pA
)]
+O(ω).
(24)
Rewriting Eqs (22) and (24) as a function of pA and q
(Gi)
A|A , we have
p˙A = ω ·Ψ0(pA, q(G1)A|A , · · · , q(Gn)A|A ) +O(ω2),
q˙
(Gi)
A|A = Ψi(pA, q
(G1)
A|A , · · · , q(Gn)A|A ) +O(ω).
For weak selection (ω  1), q(Gi)A|A equilibrates much more quickly than pA. Thus, this
dynamical system converges rapidly onto the slow manifold with Ψi(pA, q
(G1)
A|A , · · · , q(Gn)A|A ) = 0.
Then we have
q
(Gi)
A|A =
∑n
j=1 gj − 2∑n
j=1 gj − 1
pA +
1∑n
j=1 gj − 1
=
k − 2
k − 1pA +
1
k − 1 . (25)
Defining z = 1
k−1 and using Eq (25), we rewrite q
(Gi)
X|Y as
q
(Gi)
A|A = pA + z(1− pA), (26)
q
(Gi)
B|A = (1− z)(1− pA), (27)
q
(Gi)
A|B = (1− z)pA, (28)
q
(Gi)
B|B = zpA + (1− pA). (29)
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E. Diffusion approximation
Equation (25) holds for all Gi. We use Kolmogorov backward equation to study an one
dimensional diffusion process of variable pA. The fixation probability of A-players, φA(x)
with initial frequency pA(t = 0) = x satisfies the differential equation [72]:
m(x)
dφA(x)
dx
+
v(x)
2
d2φA(x)
dx2
= 0 (30)
with two boundary conditions φA(0) = 0 and φA(1) = 1. m(pA) and v(pA) represent the
mean and variance of ∆pA in each generation, respectively. The solution for the above
differential equation with boundary conditions is
φA(x) =
∫ x
0
ψ(y)dy∫ 1
0
ψ(y)dy
(31)
where
ψ(y) = exp
(
−
∫ y 2m(r)
v(r)
dr
)
. (32)
Within a short time interval, ∆t, we have
m(pA) =
E(∆pA)
∆t
=
1
N
· Prob
(
∆pA =
1
N
)
+
(
− 1
N
)
· Prob
(
∆pA = − 1
N
)
≈ ω
Nk2
(pBΓB − pAΓA) (33)
v(pA) =
V(∆pA)
∆t
≈ 1
N2
· Prob
(
∆pA =
1
N
)
+
1
N2
· Prob
(
∆pA = − 1
N
)
≈ 2(k − 2)pA(1− pA)
N2(k − 1) (34)
According to Eqs (13,14,16,18,19,21,26-29), pBΓB−pAΓA in Eq (33) is actually a polynomial
in pA. We here can write it in a form only containing variable pA. To achieve this, we make
full use of Eqs (19-22) in Supplemental Methods of Ref. [32] and Appendix B of Ref. [21] to
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obtain the following identities:
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
[x+ z(1− x)]sj [(1− z)(1− x)]gj−sj
]
as1···si···sn
=
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
xsj(1− x)gj−sj
]
g1−s1∑
r1=0
· · ·
gi−si∑
ri=0
· · ·
gn−sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)gj−sj−rj
]
a(s1+r1)···(si+ri)···(sn+rn), (35)
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
[(1− z)x]sj [zx+ 1− x]gj−sj
]
as1···si···sn
=
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
xsj(1− x)gj−sj
]
s1∑
r1=0
· · ·
si∑
ri=0
· · ·
sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)sj−rj
]
a(s1−r1)···(si−ri)···(sn−rn), (36)
x
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)
xsj(1− x)gj−δi,j−sj
]
as1···si···sn
=
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
xsj(1− x)gj−sj
]
sias1···(si−1)···sn
gi
, (37)
(1− x)
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)
xsj(1− x)gj−δi,j−sj
]
as1···si···sn
=
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
xsj(1− x)gj−sj
]
(gi − si)as1···si···sn
gi
. (38)
Replacing Eqs (26-29) into Eqs (13,14,18,19) and applying Eqs (35) and (36), we have
pi
(Gi)
A|B =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)
p
sj
A (1− pA)gj−δi,j−sj
]
g1−s1∑
r1=0
· · ·
gi−1−si∑
ri=0
· · ·
gn−sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j − sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)gj−δi,j−sj−rj
]
a(s1+r1)···(si+ri)···(sn+rn),
(39)
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pi
(Gi)
B|B =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)
p
sj
A (1− pA)gj−δi,j−sj
]
s1∑
r1=0
· · ·
si∑
ri=0
· · ·
sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)sj−rj
]
b(s1−r1)···(si−ri)···(sn−rn), (40)
pi
(Gi)
A|A =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)
p
sj
A (1− pA)gj−δi,j−sj
]
g1−s1∑
r1=0
· · ·
gi−1−si∑
ri=0
· · ·
gn−sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j − sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)gj−δi,j−sj−rj
]
a(s1+r1)···(si+ri+1)···(sn+rn),
(41)
pi
(Gi)
B|A =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)
p
sj
A (1− pA)gj−δi,j−sj
]
s1∑
r1=0
· · ·
si∑
ri=0
· · ·
sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)sj−rj
]
b(s1−r1)···(si−ri+1)···(sn−rn), (42)
Substituting Eqs (39-42) into Eq (33) and applying Eqs (37) and (38), we have
m(pA) ≈ω(k − 2)pA(1− pA)
Nk2
n∑
i=1
[
giq
(Gi)
B|B
(
pi
(Gi)
A|B − pi(Gi)B|B
)
+ giq
(Gi)
A|A
(
pi
(Gi)
A|A − pi(Gi)B|A
)]
=
ω(k − 2)pA(1− pA)
Nk2
n∑
i=1
gi{
[zpA + (1− pA)]
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)
p
sj
A (1− pA)gj−δi,j−sj
]
ics1···si···sn
+ [pA + z(1− pA)]
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi−1∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j
sj
)
p
sj
A (1− pA)gj−δi,j−sj
]
ids1···si···sn
}
=
ω(k − 2)pA(1− pA)
Nk2
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
p
sj
A (1− pA)gj−sj
]
es1···si···sn (43)
where
es1···si···sn =
n∑
i=1
[
zsi
ics1···(si−1)···sn + (gi − si)ics1···si···sn + siids1···(si−1)···sn + z(gi − si)ids1···si···sn
]
(44)
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and
ics1···si···sn
=
g1−s1∑
r1=0
· · ·
gi−1−si∑
ri=0
· · ·
gn−sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j − sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)gj−δi,j−sj−rj
]
a(s1+r1)···(si+ri)···(sn+rn)
−
s1∑
r1=0
· · ·
si∑
ri=0
· · ·
sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)sj−rj
]
b(s1−r1)···(si−ri)···(sn−rn) (45)
ids1···si···sn
=
g1−s1∑
r1=0
· · ·
gi−1−si∑
ri=0
· · ·
gn−sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − δi,j − sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)gj−δi,j−sj−rj
]
a(s1+r1)···(si+ri+1)···(sn+rn)
−
s1∑
r1=0
· · ·
si∑
ri=0
· · ·
sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)sj−rj
]
b(s1−r1)···(si−ri+1)···(sn−rn). (46)
Denoting
H(pA) =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
p
sj
A (1− pA)gj−sj
]
es1···si···sn (47)
and substituting Eqs (34) and (43) into Eqs (31) and (32), for ω  1, we have
φA(x) =
∫ x
0
exp
(
−ωN(k−1)
k2
∫ y
0
H(r)dr
)
dy∫ 1
0
exp
(
−ωN(k−1)
k2
∫ y
0
H(r)dr
)
dy
=x+
ωN(k − 1)
k2
(
x
∫ 1
0
∫ y
0
H(r)drdy −
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
H(r)drdy
)
+O(ω2) (48)
Based on the integral property of Bernstein polynomial [73],
∫ y
0
(
g
i
)
ri(1− r)g−idr = 1
g + 1
g+1∑
j=i+1
(
g + 1
j
)
yj(1− y)g+1−j (49)
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we have
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
H(r)drdy =
∫ x
0
∫ y
0
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
rsj(1− r)gj−sj
]
es1···si···sndrdy
=
∫ x
0
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 sj
) es1···si···sn∫ y
0
(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 sj
)
r
∑n
j=1 sj(1− r)
∑n
j=1 gj−
∑n
j=1 sjdrdy
=
1∑n
j=1 gj + 1
∫ x
0
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 sj
) es1···si···sn
∑n
j=1 gj+1∑
l=
∑n
j=1 sj+1
(∑n
j=1 gj + 1
l
)
yl(1− y)
∑n
j=1 gj+1−ldy
=
1
(
∑n
j=1 gj + 1)(
∑n
j=1 gj + 2)
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 sj
) es1···si···sn
∑n
j=1 gj+1∑
l=
∑n
j=1 sj+1
∑n
j=1 gj+2∑
m=l+1
(∑n
j=1 gj + 2
m
)
xm(1− x)
∑n
j=1 gj+2−m
=
1
(k + 1)(k + 2)
k+2∑
m=0
(
k + 2
m
)
xm(1− x)k+2−m
m−1∑
l=0
l−1∑
s1=0
· · ·
l−1−∑i−1j=1 sj∑
si=0
· · ·
l−1−∑n−1j=1 sj∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) es1···si···sn (50)
and
∫ 1
0
∫ y
0
H(r)drdy =
1
(k + 1)(k + 2)
k+1∑
l=0
l−1∑
s1=0
· · ·
l−1−∑i−1j=1 sj∑
si=0
· · ·
l−1−∑n−1j=1 sj∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) es1···si···sn
=
1
(k + 1)(k + 2)
k∑
l=0
l∑
s1=0
· · ·
l−∑i−1j=1 sj∑
si=0
· · ·
l−∑n−1j=1 sj∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) es1···si···sn
=
1
(k + 1)(k + 2)
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) (k + 1− n∑
j=1
sj
)
es1···si···sn .
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Extending Eq (50) and taking x = 1/N (N  1), we get
1
(k + 1)(k + 2)
[
0 + 0 +
(
k + 2
2
)
x2(1− x)ke0···0···0 + · · ·
]
=
1
(k + 1)(k + 2)
(
k + 2
2
)
x2(1− x)ke0···0···0 +O(x3)
=
e0···0···0
2N2
+O(
1
N3
) (51)
Finally, we get the fixation probability ρA = φA(1/N) for N  1, given by
ρA ≈ 1
N
+
ωN(k − 1)
k2
[ 1
N(k + 1)(k + 2)
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) (k + 1− n∑
j=1
sj
)
es1···si···sn
− e0···0···0
2N2
]
≈ 1
N
+
ω(k − 1)
k2(k + 1)(k + 2)
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) (k + 1− n∑
j=1
sj
)
es1···si···sn (52)
F. Fixation probabilities, sigma rule and structure coefficients
Equation (52) shows that ρA >
1
N
only if
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) (k + 1− n∑
j=1
sj
)
es1···si···sn > 0 (53)
From Eqs (44-46), es1···si···sn is linear in as1···si···sn and bs1···si···sn . Thus the left side of formula
(53) is linear in as1···si···sn and bs1···si···sn , implying that there are αs1···si···sn and βs1···si···sn such
that
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) (k + 1− n∑
j=1
sj
)
es1···si···sn
=
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
(αs1···si···snas1···si···sn + βs1···si···snbs1···si···sn) (54)
Hence, we rewrite ρA and the fixation probability of a single mutant ρB as
ρA ≈ 1
N
+
ω(k − 1)
k2(k + 1)(k + 2)
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
(αs1···si···snas1···si···sn + βs1···si···snbs1···si···sn) (55)
ρB ≈ 1
N
+
ω(k − 1)
k2(k + 1)(k + 2)
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
(
αs1···si···snb(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn)
+ βs1···si···sna(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn)
)
(56)
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Thus, under weak selection, we have
ρA > ρB
⇐⇒
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
(αs1···si···snas1···si···sn + βs1···si···snbs1···si···sn)
>
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
(
αs1···si···snb(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn) + βs1···si···sna(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn)
)
⇐⇒
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
(
αs1···si···sn − β(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn)
)
as1···si···sn
+
(
β(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn) − αs1···si···sn
)
b(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn) > 0
⇐⇒
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
(
αs1···si···sn − β(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn)
) (
as1···si···sn − b(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn)
)
> 0
⇐⇒
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1···si···sn
(
as1···si···sn − b(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn)
)
> 0 (57)
Equation (57) is termed ”sigma rule” and its coefficients
σs1···si···sn = αs1···si···sn − β(g1−s1)···(gi−si)···(gn−sn) (58)
are the structure coefficients. Here we refer to the method in Ref. [32] to calculate αs1···si···sn
and βs1···si···sn . For a multi-player game with as1···si···sn =
∏n
i=1 δs˜i,si (only as˜1···s˜i···s˜n = 1 and
all others are 0) and bs1···si···sn = 0, by Eq (54), we have
αs˜1···s˜i···s˜n =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) (k + 1− n∑
j=1
sj
)
es˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn , (59)
where es˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn denotes the coefficient es1···si···sn with as1···si···sn =
∏n
i=1 δs˜i,si and bs1···si···sn =
0 for any combination s1 · · · si · · · sn. Analogously, ics˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn and ids˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn respectively
correspond to ics1···si···sn and
ids1···si···sn with as1···si···sn =
∏n
i=1 δs˜i,si and bs1···si···sn = 0. From
Eqs (45) and (46), we have
ics˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn =
n∏
j=1
(
gi − δi,j − si
s˜i − si
)
zs˜i−si(1− z)gi−δi,j−s˜i
=
(
g1 − s1
g1 − s˜1
)
· · ·
(
gi − 1− si
gi − 1− s˜i
)
· · ·
(
gn − sn
gn − s˜n
)
(k − 2)k−1−
∑n
j=1 s˜j
(k − 1)k−1−
∑n
j=1 sj
, (60)
ids˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn =
n∏
j=1
(
gi − δi,j − si
s˜i − δi,j − si
)
zs˜i−δi,j−si(1− z)gi−s˜i
=
(
g1 − s1
g1 − s˜1
)
· · ·
(
gi − 1− si
gi − s˜i
)
· · ·
(
gn − sn
gn − s˜n
)
(k − 2)k−
∑n
j=1 s˜j
(k − 1)k−1−
∑n
j=1 sj
. (61)
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Substituting Eqs (44,60,61) into Eq (59), we obtain
αs˜1···s˜i···s˜n =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) (k + 1− n∑
j=1
sj
)
n∑
i=1
[
zsi
ics˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···(si−1)···sn + (gi − si)ics˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn + siids˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···(si−1)···sn + z(gi − si)ids˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn
]
=
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
n∑
i=1
[∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj+δi,j
)(
k∑n
j=1(sj+δi,j)
) (k − n∑
j=1
sj
)
(si + 1)z
ics˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn
+
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) (k + 1− n∑
j=1
sj
)
(gi − si)ics˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn
+
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj+δi,j
)(
k∑n
j=1(sj+δi,j)
) (k − n∑
j=1
sj
)
(si + 1)
ids˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn
+
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) (k + 1− n∑
j=1
sj
)
(gi − si)zids˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn
]
=
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
) n∑
i=1
[
gi − si
k − 1
(
k2 − (k − 2)
n∑
j=1
sj
)
ics˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn
+
gi − si
k − 1
(
2k + (k − 2)
n∑
j=1
sj
)
ids˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn
]
(62)
=
(k − 2)k−1−
∑n
j=1 s˜j
k − 1
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gi∑
si=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
gj−sj
gj−s˜j
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
)
[(
k2 − (k − 2)∑nj=1 sj)(k −∑nj=1 s˜j)
(k − 1)k−1−
∑n
j=1 sj
+
(k − 2)
(
2k + (k − 2)∑nj=1 sj)(∑nj=1 s˜j −∑nj=1 sj)
(k − 1)k−1−
∑n
j=1 sj
]
(63)
We make full use of a following identity to simply Eq (63):
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
gj−sj
gj−s˜j
)(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 sj
) Θ( n∑
j=1
sj,
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
=
∏n
j=1
(
gj
s˜j
)(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 s˜j
)
∑n
j=1 gj∑
l=0
( ∑n
j=1 gj − l∑n
j=1 gj −
∑n
j=1 s˜j
)
Θ
(
l,
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
, (64)
where Θ
(∑n
j=1 sj,
∑n
j=1 s˜j
)
is a function of
∑n
j=1 sj and
∑n
j=1 s˜j. We here give a brief proof
40
for this identity. First we investigate the case with n = 2.
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
(
g1
s1
)(
g1−s1
g1−s˜1
)(
g2
s2
)(
g2−s2
g2−s˜2
)(
g1+g2
s1+s2
) Θ(s1 + s2, s˜1 + s˜2)
=
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
g1!
s1!(g1 − s1)!
g2!
s2!(g2 − s2)!
(g1 − s1)!
(g1 − s˜1)!(s˜1 − s1)!
(g2 − s2)!
(g2 − s˜2)!(s˜2 − s2)!
(s1 + s2)!(g1 + g2 − s1 − s2)!
(g1 + g2)!
Θ(s1 + s2, s˜1 + s˜2)
=
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
g1!g2!
(g1 + g2)!
(s1 + s2)!
s1!s2!
(s˜1 + s˜2 − s1 − s2)!
(s˜1 − s1)!(s˜2 − s2)!
(g1 + g2 − s˜1 − s˜2)!
(g1 − s˜1)!(g2 − s˜2)!
(g1 + g2 − s1 − s2)!
(g1 + g2 − s˜1 − s˜2)!(s˜1 + s˜2 − s1 − s2)!Θ(s1 + s2, s˜1 + s˜2)
=
1(
g1+g2
g1
) g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
(
s1 + s2
s1
)(
s˜1 + s˜2 − s1 − s2
s˜1 − s1
)(
g1 + g2 − s˜1 − s˜2
g1 − s˜1
)(
g1 + g2 − s1 − s2
g1 + g2 − s˜1 − s˜2
)
Θ(s1 + s2, s˜1 + s˜2)
=
1(
g1+g2
g1
) g1+g2∑
l=0
l∑
s1=0
(
l
s1
)(
s˜1 + s˜2 − l
s˜1 − s1
)(
g1 + g2 − s˜1 − s˜2
g1 − s˜1
)(
g1 + g2 − l
g1 + g2 − s˜1 − s˜2
)
Θ(l, s˜1 + s˜2)
=
1(
g1+g2
g1
) g1+g2∑
l=0
(
s˜1 + s˜2
s˜1
)(
g1 + g2 − s˜1 − s˜2
g1 − s˜1
)(
g1 + g2 − l
g1 + g2 − s˜1 − s˜2
)
Θ(l, s˜1 + s˜2)
=
(
g1
s˜1
)(
g2
s˜2
)(
g1+g2
s˜1+s˜2
) g1+g2∑
l=0
(
g1 + g2 − l
g1 + g2 − s˜1 − s˜2
)
Θ(l, s˜1 + s˜2). (65)
Then we extend the identity in case n = 2 to any n. We decompose this long equation (see
terms in square brackets) and use Eq (65) repeatedly. Finally, we can complete the proof
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and obtain Eq (64).
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
(
g1
s1
)(
g2
s2
) · · · (gn
sn
)(
g1+g2+···+gn
s1+s2+···+sn
) (g1 − s1
g1 − s˜1
)(
g2 − s2
g2 − s˜2
)
· · ·
(
gn − sn
gn − s˜n
)
Θ
(
n∑
j=1
sj,
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
=
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn−2∑
sn−2=0
[
gn−1∑
sn−1=0
gn∑
sn=0
(
gn−1
sn−1
)(
gn
sn
)(
gn−1+gn
sn−1+sn
) (gn−1 − sn−1
gn−1 − s˜n−1
)(
gn − sn
gn − s˜n
)] (g1
s1
)(
g2
s2
) · · · (gn−2
sn−2
)(
g1+g2+···+gn
s1+s2+···+sn−2+(sn−1+sn)
)
·
(
gn−1 + gn
sn−1 + sn
)(
g1 − s1
g1 − s˜1
)(
g2 − s2
g2 − s˜2
)
· · ·
(
gn−2 − sn−2
gn−2 − s˜n−2
)
Θ
(
n−2∑
j=0
sj + (sn−1 + sn),
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
=
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn−2∑
sn−2=0
[(
gn−1
s˜n−1
)(
gn
s˜n
)(
gn−1+gn
s˜n−1+s˜n
) gn−1+gn∑
l=0
(
gn−1 + gn − l
gn−1 + gn − s˜n−1 − s˜n
)] (g1
s1
)(
g2
s2
) · · · (gn−2
sn−2
)(
g1+g2+···+gn
s1+s2+···+sn−2+l
)
·
(
gn−1 + gn
l
)(
g1 − s1
g1 − s˜1
)(
g2 − s2
g2 − s˜2
)
· · ·
(
gn−2 − sn−2
gn−2 − s˜n−2
)
Θ
(
n−2∑
j=0
sj + l,
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
=
(
gn−1
s˜n−1
)(
gn
s˜n
)(
gn−1+gn
s˜n−1+s˜n
) g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn−3∑
sn−3=0
[
gn−2∑
sn−2=0
gn−1+gn∑
l=0
(
gn−2
sn−2
)(
gn−1+gn
l
)(
gn−2+gn−1+gn
l+sn−2
) ( gn−1 + gn − l
gn−1 + gn − s˜n−1 − s˜n
)
(
gn−2 − sn−2
gn−2 − s˜n−2
)]
·
(
gn−2 + gn−1 + gn
l + sn−2
) (g1
s1
)(
g2
s2
) · · · (gn−3
sn−3
)(
g1+g2+···+gn
s1+s2+···+(sn−2+l)
)(g1 − s1
g1 − s˜1
)(
g2 − s2
g2 − s˜2
)
· · ·
(
gn−3 − sn−3
gn−3 − s˜n−3
)
·Θ
(
n−3∑
j=0
sj + (sn−2 + l),
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
= · · · · · ·
=
∏n
j=1
(
gj
s˜j
)(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 s˜j
)
∑n
j=1 gj∑
l=0
( ∑n
j=1 gj − l∑n
j=1 gj −
∑n
j=1 s˜j
)
Θ
(
l,
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
Applying Eq (64) to Eq (63) and taking
∑n
j=1 gj = k, we have
αs˜1s˜2···s˜n =
(k − 2)k−1−
∑n
j=1 s˜j
k − 1
Πnj=1
(
gj
s˜j
)(
k∑n
j=1 s˜j
) k∑
l=0
(k − l)
[(
k − 1− l
k − 1−∑nj=1 s˜j
)
k2 − (k − 2)l
(k − 1)k−1−l
+
(
k − 1− l
k −∑nj=1 s˜j
)
(2k + (k − 2)l)(k − 2)
(k − 1)k−1−l
]
. (66)
Analogously, we use a multi-player game with as1···si···sn = 0 and bs1···si···sn =
∏n
i=1 δs˜i,si
(only bs˜1···s˜i···s˜n = 1 and all others are 0) to calculate βs˜1···s˜i···s˜n . βs˜1···s˜i···s˜n also has the form
of Eq (62). Using Eq (54) and referring to Eqs (59-63), we have
ics˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn =−
n∏
j=1
(
sj
sj − s˜j
)
zsj−s˜j(1− z)s˜j
=−
(
s1
s1 − s˜1
)
· · ·
(
si
si − s˜i
)
· · ·
(
sn
sn − s˜n
)
(k − 2)
∑n
j=1 s˜j
(k − 1)
∑n
j=1 sj
, (67)
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ids˜1···s˜i···s˜ns1···si···sn =−
n∏
j=1
(
sj
sj − s˜j + δi,j
)
zsj−s˜j+δi,j(1− z)s˜j−δi,j
=−
(
s1
s1 − s˜1
)
· · ·
(
si
si − s˜i + 1
)
· · ·
(
sn
sn − s˜n
)
(k − 2)
∑n
j=1 s˜j−1
(k − 1)
∑n
j=1 sj
. (68)
Here we give two identities, which can be derived in an analogous way to Eq (64), i.e.,
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
sj
sj−s˜j
)(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 sj
) Θ( n∑
j=1
sj,
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
=
∏n
j=1
(
gj
s˜j
)(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 s˜j
)
∑n
j=1 gj∑
l=0
(
l∑n
j=1 s˜j
)
Θ
(
l,
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
(69)
and
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
∏n
j=1
(
gj
sj
)(
sj
sj−s˜j+δi,j
)(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 sj
) (gi − si)Θ( n∑
j=1
sj,
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
=
s˜i∑
j s˜j
∏n
j=1
(
gj
s˜j
)(∑n
j=1 gj∑n
j=1 s˜j
)
∑n
j=1 gj∑
l=0
(
l∑n
j=1 s˜j − 1
)
Θ
(
l,
n∑
j=1
s˜j
)
(70)
Substituting Eqs (67) and (68) into Eq (62) and applying Eqs (69,70), we have
βs˜1s˜2···s˜n =−
(k − 2)
∑n
j=1 s˜j
k − 1
Πnj=1
(
gj
s˜j
)(
k∑n
j=1 s˜j
) k∑
l=0
(k − l)
[(
l∑n
j=1 s˜j
)
k2 − (k − 2)l
(k − 1)l
+
(
l∑n
j=1 s˜j − 1
)
2k + (k − 2)l
(k − 2)(k − 1)l
]
(71)
Substituting Eq (66) and Eq (71) into Eq (58), we have
σs1s2···sn =
(k − 2)(k−
∑n
j=1 sj)
k − 1
Πnj=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
)
k∑
l=0
(k − l)
{[
k2 − (k − 2)l]Φ(k, n∑
j=1
sj, l
)
+ [2k + (k − 2)l] Ψ
(
k,
n∑
j=1
sj, l
)}
(72)
where
Φ(k, i, l) =
(
k − 1− l
k − 1− i
)
1
(k − 2)(k − 1)k−1−l +
(
l
k − i
)
1
(k − 1)l ,
Ψ(k, i, l) =
(
k − 1− l
k − i
)
1
(k − 1)k−1−l +
(
l
k − 1− i
)
1
(k − 2)(k − 1)l .
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Combining Eqs (55-57) and normalizing σs1s2···sn by dividing (k
2(k + 1)(k + 2)), we have
ρA − ρB = ω
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn
(
as1s2···sn − b(g1−s1)(g2−s2)···(gn−sn)
)
(73)
where σs1s2···sn is the normalized structure coefficients, given by
σs1s2···sn =
(k − 2)(k−
∑n
j=1 sj)
k2(k + 1)(k + 2)
Πnj=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
)
k∑
l=0
(k − l)
{[
k2 − (k − 2)l]Φ(k, n∑
j=1
sj, l
)
+ [2k + (k − 2)l] Ψ
(
k,
n∑
j=1
sj, l
)}
.
(74)
This equation corresponds to Eq (1) in the main text.
G. Replicator equation
Infinite populations usually serve as a baseline model to investigate the evolutionary dy-
namics of a system. Therefore we conduct a consistent investigation in infinite populations.
The evolutionary dynamics of multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity can be de-
scribed in terms of replicator equation. Substituting Eqs (45) and (46) into Eq (43) and
applying Eq (37), we have the replicator equation for evolutionary multiplayer games on
graphs with n types of edges
x˙ =
ω(k − 2)x(1− x)
k2
f(x) (75)
where
f(x) =
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj
sj
)
xsj(1− x)gj−sj
]
(Λa − Λb) , (76)
Λa =
g1−s1∑
r1=0
g2−s2∑
r2=0
· · ·
gn−sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
gj − sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)gj−sj−rj
]
n∑
j=1
[
(sj + rj) a(s1+r1)(s2+r2)···(sn+rn) +
(
zsj +
rj
z
)
a(s1+r1−δ1j)(s2+r2−δ2j)···(sn+rn−δnj)
]
,
Λb =
s1∑
r1=0
s2∑
r2=0
· · ·
sn∑
rn=0
[
n∏
j=1
(
sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)sj−rj
]
n∑
j=1
[
(gj − sj + rj) b(s1−r1)(s2−r2)···(sn−rn) +
(
z(gj − sj) + rj
z
)
b(s1−r1+δ1j)(s2−r2+δ2j)···(sn−rn+δnj)
]
.
This seemingly complicated Eq (76) could be greatly simplified when applied to specific
examples, such as traditional multiplayer games or pairwise games on graphs [55].
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II. SECTION 2. RECOVER THE PREVIOUS RESULTS AS A SPECIFIC CASE
WITH n = 1
We can recover previous results in Ref. [32] as a specific case by taking g1 = k and gi = 0
for i 6= 1, and thus rewrite the structure coefficient as
σs =
(k − 2)(k−s)
k2(k + 1)(k + 2)
k∑
l=0
(k − l){[k2 − (k − 2)l]Φ(k, s, l) + [2k + (k − 2)l] Ψ(k, s, l)}
where
Φ(k, i, l) =
(
k − 1− l
k − 1− i
)
1
(k − 2)(k − 1)k−1−l +
(
l
k − i
)
1
(k − 1)l ,
Ψ(k, i, l) =
(
k − 1− l
k − i
)
1
(k − 1)k−1−l +
(
l
k − 1− i
)
1
(k − 2)(k − 1)l .
We can also recover the previous results by assuming that two A−players belonging to
different types have an identical impact to their common opponent. Plainly, as1s2···sn and
bs1s2···sn are unchanged if
∑
j sj is fixed. Then the sum of σs1s2···sn for all configurations
satisfying
∑n
j=1 sj = s corresponds to the structure coefficient of term as − bk−s. Hence, we
have
σs =
∑
∑n
j=1 sj=s
σs1s2···sn
=
∑
∑n
j=1 sj=s
(k − 2)(k−1−s)
k2(k + 1)(k + 2)
Πnj=1
(
gj
sj
)(
k∑n
j=1 sj
)
k∑
l=0
(k − l){[k2 − (k − 2)l]Φ(k, s, l) + [2k + (k − 2)l] Ψ(k, s, l)}
=
(k − 2)(k−1−s)
k2(k + 1)(k + 2)
k∑
l=0
(k − l){[k2 − (k − 2)l]Φ(k, s, l) + [2k + (k − 2)l] Ψ(k, s, l)} .
(77)
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III. SECTION 3. DIVERSE MULTIPLAYER GAMES
The number of edges of type i is gi. We designate m the number of different values
among all gis (1 ≤ i ≤ n), lj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) the m corresponding values, and nj the number
of edge types having lj edges. Accordingly, we have
∑m
j=1 nj = n and
∑m
j=1 ljnj = k. For
a clear description, we designate gi = lj for i ∈ Vj =
[∑j−1
u=1 nu + 1,
∑j
u=1 nu
]
. Here we
investigate a scenario where each individual plays different games with different individuals
simultaneously. We let individuals linked by the same type of edges form a group to play a
multiplayer game. Games defined in different types of edges are independent and thus could
be different in both game metaphors or payoff entries. Then the payoff can be reduced to
as1s2···sn = a
1
s1
+ a2s2 + · · ·+ ansn , (78)
bs1s2···sn = b
1
s1
+ b2s2 + · · ·+ bnsn . (79)
aisi (b
i
si
) represents the payoff of an A−player (a B−player) obtained from the interaction
with individuals of type i where there are si opposing A-players.
A. Finite populations
We first investigate how the independence of payoffs obtained in different games affects
the “sigma rule” [see Eq (57)]. Using the above notations, we have
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn
(
as1s2···sn − b(g1−s1)(g2−s2)···(gn−sn)
)
> 0
⇐⇒
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn
n∑
i=1
(aisi − bigi−si) > 0
⇐⇒
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn
m∑
j=1
∑
i∈Vj
(aisi − bigi−si) > 0
⇐⇒
m∑
j=1
∑
i∈Vj
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn(a
i
si
− bigi−si) > 0 (80)
Here we analyze the case for j = 1, V1 = [1, n1], and g1 = g2 = · · · = gn1 = l1. Other cases
can be calculated analogously. We have∑
i∈V1
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn(a
i
si
− bigi−si)
=
g1∑
s1=0
(a1s1 − b1g1−s1)
g2∑
s2=0
g3∑
s3=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn +
g2∑
s2=0
(a2s2 − b2g2−s2)
g1∑
s1=0
g3∑
s3=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn + · · ·
+
gn1∑
sn1=0
(an1sn1 − b
n1
gn1−sn1 )
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gn1−1∑
sn1−1=0
gn1+1∑
sn1+1=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn (81)
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From Eq (77), we have
σs1s2···sn =
(
k∑n
j=1 sj
)
Πnj=1
(
gj
sj
)σ∑n
j=1 sj
(82)
Especially, for gi = gj, σs1s2···sn remains unchanged after exchanging the ith and the jth
subscripts of σs1s2···sn , i.e., σs1···si−1sisi+1···sj−1sjsj+1···sn = σs1···si−1sjsi+1···sj−1sisj+1···sn . Denoting
g2∑
s2=0
g3∑
s3=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn = σ˜
1
s1
, (83)
we have
g1∑
s1=0
g3∑
s3=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn =
g1∑
s1=0
g3∑
s3=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs2s1···sn = σ˜
1
s2
, (84)
and
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gn1−1∑
sn1−1=0
gn1+1∑
sn1+1=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn = σ˜
1
sn1
. (85)
Overall, Eq (81) can be rewritten as
g1∑
s1=0
(a1s1 − b1g1−s1)σ˜1s1 +
g2∑
s2=0
(a2s2 − b2g2−s2)σ˜1s2 + · · ·+
gn1∑
sn1=0
(an1sn1 − b
n1
gn1−sn1 )σ˜
1
sn1
=
l1∑
s=0
σ˜1s
(∑
i∈V1
ais −
∑
i∈V1
bil1−s
)
(86)
Substituting Eq 86 into Eq 80, we have
m∑
j=1
lj∑
s=0
σ˜js
∑
i∈Vj
ais −
∑
i∈Vj
bilj−s
 > 0 (87)
where
σ˜js =
g1∑
s1=0
· · ·
gr−1∑
sr−1=0
gr+1∑
sr+1=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···sn (88)
and r =
∑j−1
u=1 nu+1. Thus the effects of the population structure are captured by
∑m
j=1(lj+
1) structure coefficients. Especially, for g1 = g2 = · · · = gn = g, ρA > ρB is equivalent to
g∑
s=0
σ˜1s
(
n∑
i=1
ais −
n∑
i=1
big−s
)
> 0. (89)
Using Eqs (55), (56), (66) and (71), we find that for sufficient large populations the fixa-
tion probabilities (both ρA and ρB) under diverse multiplayer games can be approximated
by assuming players playing a unified game, where the payoff structure correspond to the
average over all games.
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B. Infinite populations
We proceed with the study of diverse multiplayer games in infinite populations. Applying
Eqs (78) and (79) into Eq (76), we have
f(x) =
n∑
j=1
gj∑
sj=0
(
gj
sj
)
xsj(1− x)gj−sj
gj−sj∑
rj=0
(
gj − sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)gj−sj−rj[
[(1 + z)(k − gj) + sj + rj] ajsj+rj +
(
zsj +
rj
z
)
ajsj+rj−1
]
−
n∑
j=1
gj∑
sj=0
(
gj
sj
)
xsj(1− x)gj−sj
sj∑
rj=0
(
sj
rj
)
zrj(1− z)sj−rj[
[(1 + z)(k − gj) + gj − sj + rj] bjsj−rj +
(
z(gj − sj) + rj
z
)
bjsj−rj+1
]
=
m∑
i=1
li∑
s=0
(
li
s
)
xs(1− x)li−s
li−s∑
r=0
(
li − s
r
)
zr(1− z)li−s−r[
[(1 + z)(k − li) + s+ r]
∑
j∈Vi
ajs+r +
(
zs+
r
z
)∑
j∈Vi
ajs+r−1
]
−
m∑
i=1
li∑
s=0
(
li
s
)
xs(1− x)li−s
s∑
r=0
(
s
r
)
zr(1− z)s−r[
[(1 + z)(k − li) + li − s+ r]
∑
j∈Vi
bjs−r +
(
z(li − s) + r
z
)∑
j∈Vi
bjs−r+1
]
. (90)
Furthermore, if we introduce two notations
a¯is =
1
ni
∑
j∈Vi
ajs,
b¯is =
1
ni
∑
j∈Vi
bjs,
which correspond to the average of payoff values over games of same sizes, i.e., gjs are
identical for j ∈ Vi. In other words, for games of same sizes, we can use the average of their
payoff values to approximate the evolutionary dynamics. Especially, for g1 = g2 = · · · =
gn = g, the evolutionary dynamics can be approximated by a unified payoff structure
a¯s =
1
n
n∑
j=1
ajs,
b¯s =
1
n
n∑
j=1
bjs.
We end this section by an example of evolutionary games on weighted networks with
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g1 = g2 = · · · = gn = g. We endow the jth type of edges a weight ζj. The payoff structure is
ajs = ζjas, (91)
bjs = ζjbs, (92)
where as (bs) is a function of s. Substituting Eqs (91) and (92) into Eq (90), we have that
f(x) =
n∑
j=1
ζj ·
g∑
s=0
(
g
s
)
xs(1− x)g−s{
g−s∑
r=0
(
g − s
r
)
zr(1− z)g−s−r
[
[(1 + z)(k − g) + s+ r] as+r +
(
zs+
r
z
)
as+r−1
]
−
s∑
r=0
(
s
r
)
zr(1− z)s−r
[
[(1 + z)(k − g) + g − s+ r] bs−r +
(
z(g − s) + r
z
)
bs−r+1
]}
.
(93)
Equation (93) shows that the values of x satisfying f(x) = 0 are independent of ζj for any
j. Thus, nonuniform strength of interactions does not affect the evolutionary dynamics.
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IV. SECTION 4. SIGMA RULE AND STRUCTURE COEFFICIENT FOR EVO-
LUTIONARY TWO-PLAYER GAMES ON GRAPHS WITH n TYPES OF EDGES
In evolutionary two-player games on graphs, interactions occurring in each type of edges
are assigned a payoff matrix. The payoff matrix for interactions occurring in edges of type
i is ( A B
A αi βi
B γi θi
)
where each value corresponds to the payoff assigned to the individual adopting a strategy
in the row against its partner taking a strategy in the column. Transforming the pay-
off to multiplayer interactions through as1s2···sn =
∑n
i=1 [siαi + (gi − si)βi] and bs1s2···sn =∑n
i=1 [siγi + (gi − si)θi], we have the sigma rule from Eq (58)
n∑
i=1
s¯iαi +
n∑
i=1
(gi − s¯i) βi −
n∑
i=1
(gi − s¯i) γi −
n∑
i=1
s¯iθi > 0 (94)
where
s¯i =
g1∑
s1=0
g2∑
s2=0
· · ·
gn∑
sn=0
σs1s2···snsi.
Here we show how to get s¯i relying on a previous study [74]. Assuming that interactions
along all edges except edges of type i bring no benefits (αj = 0, βj = 0, γj = 0, θj = 0 for
j 6= i), Eq 94 can be rewritten as
ρA > ρB ⇐⇒ s¯iαi + (gi − s¯i) βi − (gi − s¯i) γi − s¯iθi > 0. (95)
From the perspective of separated interaction graph and replacement graph, in the interac-
tion graph, these edges corresponding to interactions with no payoffs seem to be removed,
leading to asymmetric interaction and replacement graphs. From Ref. [74], we have
ρA > ρB ⇐⇒ (k + 1)αi + (k − 1)βi − (k − 1)γi − (k + 1)θi > 0. (96)
Comparing Eqs (95) and (96), we have
s¯i =
gi(k + 1)
2k
. (97)
Thus we have sigma rule shown in the main text
n∑
i=1
[gi(k + 1)αi + gi(k − 1)βi] >
n∑
i=1
[gi(k − 1)γi + gi(k + 1)θi] .
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